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When Church Teachings and Policy
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Representatives
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Providence College

Abstract: This article investigates the influence of religious values on domestic
social policy-making, with a particular focus on Catholics. We analyze roll call
votes in the 109th Congress and find that Catholic identification is associated
with support for Catholic Social Teaching, but both younger Catholics and
Republican Catholics are found less supportive. In followup interviews with a
small sample of Catholic Republicans, we find that they justify voting
contrary to Church teaching by seeing its application to most domestic social
issues as less authoritative than Church moral teachings on issues like abortion.

INTRODUCTION
Since Benson and William’s (1982) path-breaking analysis, scholars have
increasingly, albeit slowly, given attention to the role of religion in
shaping legislative politics. After almost 25 years of scholarship in this
area, we can feel confident in two propositions. First, legislator religion
influences legislator policy preferences and decision-making. This is the
case whether we define religion using categorical denominational
measures (Chessanthis, Gilbert, and Grimes 1991; Fastnow, Grant, and
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Rudolf 1999; Gohmann and Ohsfeldt 1994; Page et al. 1984; Richardson
and Fox 1972, 1975; Schecter 2002; Tatalovich and Schier 1993), or
more nuanced measures such as level of orthodoxy (Green and Guth
1991), or salience (Yamane and Oldmixon 2006). Second, constituency
religion also influences legislator decision-making (O’Connor and
Berkman 1993, 1995; Meier and McFarlane 1993; Oldmixon 2005).
That is, legislators represent religious sub-constituencies in the same
way they represent other socio-demographic sub-constituencies, such as
those on the basis of race, partisanship, or class.
It is less clear, however, whether the effect of religion on legislation
politics is operative across policy domains or in just a few select areas.
One of the reasons scholars expect religion to shape political preferences
and behaviors at the elite and mass levels, is that religious creeds provide
individuals with a set of fundamental values that guide how they should
live in the secular realm (Wald 2003, 27). On issues that are relevant to
creedal teachings, then, religion has the potential to influence political
preferences and behaviors and animate political engagement. In investigating the religion and policy-making nexus, scholars have focused on
hot button moral issues (for example, see Schecter 2002; Tatalovich
and Schier 1993), general ideological orientations (e.g., Fastnow,
Grant, and Rudolf 1999), and even foreign policy (Oldmixon,
Rosenson, and Wald 2005; Trice 1977). This makes sense, since for
many religious adherents; creedal values are relevant in all these areas.
Yet we have neglected to investigate the relationship between religion
and domestic social policy, which includes issues such as the minimum
wage, taxation, social insurance, and health care.
To the extent that social policy debates are informed by religious teachings, we should expect to find that religion influences legislative behavior
in this area as well. This article investigates this possibility in the U.S.
House of Representatives in the 109th Congress (2005–2006). The analysis focuses on Catholic legislators — Catholic Republicans, in particular.
The analysis focuses on Catholics for two reasons. First, the Catholic
Church offers explicit teachings on many domestic social policy issues.
Second, Catholics are confronted with conflicting impulses on many of
these issues. As the American bishops express it, Catholic Social
Teaching (CST) encourages progressive policy-making in this domain,
yet the upwardly mobile status of American Catholics encourages a
more conservative approach. We analyze a series of roll call votes that
are directly relevant to CST and on which the U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops (USCCB) offered guidance. This is supplemented
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by a handful of elite interviews with legislators and Capitol Hill staff and
staff at the USCCB. Ultimately, we find that Catholic legislators are
strongly supportive of the domestic social policy aspects of CST.
Among Catholic legislators, however, Republicans, younger legislators,
and legislators for whom religion is highly salient, are less supportive
of CST than their peers.

CONFLICTING IMPULSES
In addition to a common creed, “Religion also denotes a social group . . .
a community of believers” who share “a common status” (Wald 2003, 25,
emphasis in the original). The status of a group may produce shared political preferences that are in the interest of the group, and that was certainly the case among Catholics for much of the twenty-century. As a
largely ghettoized working class immigrant population, Catholics were
Democratic loyalists and strong supporters of the New Deal. In the
decades since the New Deal, however, the socio-economic status of
American Catholics has improved and is virtually indistinguishable
from that of Protestants. As Catholics joined the ranks of the middleclass and the salience of the New Deal faded, their rock-ribbed support
for the Democratic Party slowly eroded. A plurality still identifies as
Democrats, but a slight majority voted for the Republican candidate,
George W. Bush, in the 2004 presidential election. In addition to their
importance at the mass level, Catholics are also well represented at the
highest levels of government. For example, they are the plurality religion
in the U.S. House of Representatives, comprising about 30% of the membership. This puts Catholics in a position to influence policy-making
across an array issues, foreign and especially domestic.
As policy-makers, Catholics often confront conflicting impulses. E.J.
Dionne once noted, “Being a Catholic liberal or a Catholic conservative
inevitably means having a bad conscience about something.”1 This is
because CST cross-cuts traditional partisan and ideological alignments
and it makes Catholic elites a useful “case study of the manner in
which the obligations of citizenship and discipleship may interact and
conflict” (Jelen 2006, 70). To be sure, this is the case among many
Democrats. On several issues, most importantly abortion, but also stem
cell research and same-sex marital rights, many liberal Democratic politicians hold policy views at odds with Church teaching.2 Because of
Church teaching on abortion and other issues, Democratic Catholic
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politicians have had to face the dilemma of how to reconcile the teachings of their Church with their public policy commitments. To address
the perception that they were unfaithful to their Church, fifty-five
Democratic members of Congress recently issued a statement of their
commitment “to making real the basic principles that are at the heart
of Catholic social teaching.”3 It is worth noting that on these very
issues where Democratic policy commitments and CST apparently conflict, voluminous scholarship demonstrates that controlling for partisanship Catholic legislators tend to support the principles of Catholic
doctrine (Chessanthis, Gilbert, and Grimes 1991; Gohmann and
Ohsfeldt 1994; Oldmixon 2005; Schecter 2002; Tatalovich and Schier
1993).
However, CST offers a fully elaborated set of teachings that go well
beyond abortion and other questions of sexual and reproductive ethics.
On policy issues such as taxes, immigration, health care, and economic
inequality, Republican Catholic legislators often take public policy positions at odds with CST and have to grapple with how their public
responsibilities conflict with their religious obligation to promote the
Church’s conception of the common good. It is important to note,
however, that in contrast to the clear and unambiguous conflict that
many liberal Democratic politicians face on life issues, the potential
conflict between Republican legislators and CST is more opaque.
This stems from the less definitive character of many of the moral principles of CST, especially in their application to specific economic or
other domestic policies (Gaillardetz 2005, 89 – 90). While the foundational moral teachings of CST, such as the dignity of the human
person, have dogmatic character in Roman Catholic theology, the
moral principles which derive from them, such as “a preferential
option of the poor,” are authoritative yet historically contingent and
potentially reversible in changing contexts.
While this differing status of Catholic Republican dissent makes their
“bad conscience” potentially less troublesome for them, the Republican
Party’s embrace of conservative economic policy commitments in
recent years does put them at odds with the more communitarian
outlook of CST, as it expressed by the American episcopacy. With the
assumption that prosperity across all sectors of society comes with less
government regulation of the economy, the conservative vision embraced
by many Republicans is characterized by an effort to limit taxation on
wealth, limit the size of the welfare state and allow the free market to
set wages. In the words of a more libertarian champion, many of these
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policies represent an effort to free individuals from “dependence on government and making them owners instead, in control of their own lives
and destinies.”4 Central to accomplishing this vision are fundamental
reforms in policy areas such as privatizing Social Security, enhancing
market competition in health care through “Health Savings Account,”
and tax law changes to radically lower income tax rates, abolish the
estate tax, and shield savings and investment from taxation. The thrust
of these reforms aims to replace the New Deal legacy of social insurance
and social welfare programs with individually owned and controlled
assets (see Hudson 2005). The most fruitful efforts to advance laissezfaire social policies have thus far been in the area of tax policy. In the
109th Congress, where we focus, efforts to reform Social Security and
expand Health Savings accounts have failed. However, the president
and Republican majority did manage to extend prior cuts in capital
gains and dividend rates.

THE SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT
With regard to domestic social policy, CST and many Republican policy
commitments arguably conflict for two reasons. First, among more libertarian Republicans, their world view is inconsistent with that of Roman
Catholicism, the former being individualistic and the latter being
social. Libertarians regard human beings as “self-owned,” neither responsible to nor encumbered by anyone else in determining life’s ends and
goals.5 Nothing could be further from the Catholic understanding of
human beings as socially embedded creatures, made to live in community
with one another. In characterizing the policy agenda of the USCCB, one
of its staffers noted that people “are sacred beings, and we are radically
social, like the Trinity is radically social. We are defined by our community and our family. Therefore, we are obligated to one another.”6 Notes
Catholic philosopher Henri Rommen, “Sociality is as essential to human
nature as rationality” (quoted in Hines 2002, 193). As socially embedded
beings, individuals are “enmeshed in institutions that both constrain and
empower them” (Coleman 2004, 5).
The result of this incompatibility between libertarian and Catholic
thought is that they imply incompatible conceptions of the common
good. The social understanding of human nature links directly to the
Catholic understanding of the common good, which the late Pope John
XXIII defined as “the sum total of conditions of social living, whereby
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men are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection.”7
Individual well being, in this conception, depends on the character of the
society in which they live; it is not solely in their own individual hands.
For libertarians, such talk of a “common good” makes no sense, since
they believe that only individuals can have goals, purposes, interests,
and values; all goods are individual. This is what former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher meant when she famously remarked that
“there is no such thing as society.”
Closely related to the virtue of solidarity in Catholic social thought, in
fact, following from it, is the notion of “the preferential option for the
poor,” which refers to the responsibility of the powerful for the weak
and the readiness to share with them as an attribute of solidarity (Dorr
1992, 327).8 In their letter Economic Justice for All, the American
Bishops emphasized the need for public policy to be evaluated in terms
of its impact on the poor and its capacity to overcome sharp social inequalities (Land 1994, 81 –83). From the perspective of CST, public policy
attentive to the option for the poor needs to ameliorate structural injustices
that produce inequality and prevent some from sharing in and contributing
to the common good. To do so in market economies requires attention to
how those economies in their normal operation, even as they generate
overall prosperity, tend to distribute that prosperity unequally.9 Yet the
thrust of Republican domestic policy initiatives emphasizes market outcomes and potentially subjects the poor to greater risk. Republican tax
policies have been heavily biased toward the wealthiest Americans while
their support for the Earned Income Tax Credit, for example, has been
lukewarm. Moreover, by reducing government revenues, tax cuts have
increased deficits and created enormous pressure to cut government
spending. This has meant, in practice, as it did in the 1980s — cutting discretionary domestic spending with the least powerful political support —
programs for the poor.10
Recently, the debate over immigration policy has placed many conservative Republican legislators at odds with Church teaching and the
Church hierarchy. Los Angeles Archbishop Roger Cardinal Mahoney
made headlines early this year denouncing the House version of an immigration reform bill that would make assisting illegal immigrants a felony.
The bill had the strong support of the House Republican leadership,
including Congressman Peter King (R-NY), then chair of the House
Homeland Security Committee and a Catholic. Mahoney said he would
order priests in his diocese not to obey the law if enacted. Other
Church leaders have supported this position and the USCCB has
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lobbied against the House version.11 Mahoney, and other Catholics, see
the conservative Republican stance on immigration as contrary to
respect for fundamental human dignity and the Gospel imperative to
serve those in need. He explicitly linked the Church’s stance to its prolife agenda.12 Immigration is not an economic issue in the way that taxation and health care are, but the Church’s position is based in a concern
for the poor and vulnerable.
Second, among more mainstream conservative Republicans, their
dissent from Church teaching may be more about means than ends.
These Republicans may embrace the concepts of the common good, solidarity, and the preferential option for the poor, but disagree with the
Church about how these concepts should by applied to specific policies.
Many argue that Church teachings on domestic social issues are less
authoritative than teachings on other issues and involve prudential judgments from which even a faithful Catholic might dissent in the face of
even the strongest exhortations of Church leaders. So, Catholic politicians
who choose not to abide by the recommendations of the Bishop’s pastoral
letters on peace, capital punishment, or the poor might “legitimately
differ with the bishops regarding these moral applications and prudential
judgments” (Gaillardetz 2005, 90). Conservative Catholics may
embrace the Church’s conception of the common good, but reject the
idea that an expanded welfare state is the best way to achieve that goal,
and they may exercise their prudential judgment as such. Also, legislators
might point to the principle of subsidiary, which is a vital component of
CST. It encourages the limited government and the dispersion — rather
than the centralization — of the functions of government. Practically
speaking, this means that if the Bishops Conference supports a piece of
legislation because it advances economic social justice, a legislator
might in good faith vote against that bill while (1) exercising his or her
prudential judgment, and/or (2) advancing another principle of CST —
subsidiary.
In sum, those Catholic legislators who have supported the Republican
policy initiatives of the past few years have embraced policies that are
arguably inconsistent with elements of CST and almost certainly contrary to the policy positions of the Bishops Conference. Thus, one can
reasonably hypothesize that Catholic Republican legislators might
suffer from Dionne’s “bad conscience” when it comes to many of the
domestic social policy positions of their party. In the rest of this
paper, we will look to see whether Church positions affect the voting
behavior of Catholic legislators and, to the extent that Catholic
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Republicans deviate from Church positions, explore how they understand
these deviations.

INVESTIGATING SUPPORT FOR CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING
In this section, we examine roll call data from the 109th Congress to see
what influenced Catholic legislators on some key domestic issues. The
dependent variable is an additive index that measures support for the
domestic social policy dimension of CST. The Bishops Conference produces a regular report of the issues before for Congress on which they
have taken a position.13 Using this report, we identified six votes and
one discharge petition in the 109th Congress that engage the principles
of CST in this policy domain.14 A review of the bills, which are listed
in the Appendix, will reveal that the thrust of the index is left leaning
— thus, the Republican dilemma. Again, these bills were hand picked
by the Bishops Conference. Some legislators missed votes. To avoid
losing observations, we generated the index by calculating the proportion
of votes cast consistent with CST for each legislator that cast at least four
votes. The proportions were divided into four ordinal categories (0–3),
with high scores indicating high levels of support for CST.15 The alpha
is .9495, indicating a reliable index.
We ran two models: one that included all members of the Housess and
another that only included Catholics. All of the models included the following independent variables: legislator partisanship (Republican ¼ 1),
district partisanship (percent of the district vote for the Democratic presidential nominee in the 2004 election), ideology (2005 American
Conservative Union Scores, adjusted for missed votes), a generational
dummy, and district median income. The model for all legislators also
includes dummy variables for legislator religion (Catholic ¼ 1,
Jewish ¼ 1, White Evangelical ¼ 1, Black Protestant ¼ 1).16 The
Catholics only model includes an additional variable for religious
salience.17
As we noted earlier, scholars have found that Catholic legislators are
more likely to embrace moral traditionalism than their non-Catholic
colleagues. This is consistent with CST. We expect to find, therefore,
that this consistency carries over into the domestic social policy
domain. This can be owed to the historical status of Catholics as an
out-group, but also the clear and authoritative teachings of the Church
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in this area. Among Catholics, we expect to find that religious salience is
also positively associated with support for CST. The inclusion of a
salience measure allows us to move beyond discrete denominational
classifications, and measure the extent to which religious commitment,
in addition to identification, affects decision-making. Reliable measures
of religious salience are difficult to attain. While some have attempted
to measure salience using interviews (Benson and Williams 1982;
Yamane and Oldmixon 2006), Guth and Kellstedt (2001) adopt a more
“unobtrusive” approach, using internet sources to garner information
about legislator religious involvement beyond affiliation. Taking our
cue from them, we read the official biographies of each Catholic legislator that is linked to their House web page. Using a dichotomous
measure, legislators who mention religious involvement or their religious
identification in their biographies were coded 1, and the rest 0. That being
said, this measure is a blunt instrument. It may be a measure of salience,
but we concede that it may also capture the desire to project religious salience to constituents.
We also expect to find generational differences among Catholic legislators. More specifically, we expect that younger Catholics — those who
came into the electorate after the Second Vatican Council — will be less
likely to support CST on domestic social policy than older Catholics.
This is coded as a dummy variable (born after 1947 ¼ 1). Vatican II
called on Catholics to apply their religious values to the secular problems.
In short, it encouraged social transformation animated by Catholic values.
In addition to issues of moral traditionalism, this included social transformation related to poverty, social justice, civil rights, nuclear proliferation, war, etc. The Church retained its moral traditionalism with regard
to sexual ethics and traditional families, but it also took a leftward turn in
other areas (Wald 2003, 252 –257). However, the ability of the Church to
educate Catholics about the new priorities that emerged from Vatican II
was undermined by contemporaneous institutional reforms in religious
formation practices. “Influential Catholic educators questioned the compatibility of ‘education’ and ‘formation,’ two concepts that preconciliar
Catholic educators understood to be intimately related” (Appleby 1997,
100–101). The idea of “religious formation” was increasingly
questioned, and a new emphasis was placed on “free thinking”
and other secular pedagogical models. “Just when American Catholic
educators were emphasizing process over content,” Appleby (1997,
101) notes that “the universal church was offering a great deal of
‘new’ content to master.” As a result of these institutional changes,
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post Vatican II Catholics may not have internalized Church teachings in
these areas.
At the same time, these younger baby boomer Catholics came of age as
Catholics were entering the middle-class and the New Deal was losing
salience. In their generation, the political stigma associated with being
a Catholic was diminished by the election of a Catholic president in
1960. At the same time, the structure of Catholic social life changed as
ghettoized ethnic neighborhoods broke up and Catholics joined the
ranks of the middle-class. They did not move en masse to the
Republican Party, but they are far less Democratic than their parent’s generation (Appleby 1997, 98– 99; Jelen 2006, 72). The status of these
younger Catholics likely makes them more sympathetic to Republicans
than their parents were.
Given the policy commitments of the Republican Party in Congress,
we expect Republican partisanship will be negatively associated with
support for CST. By the same token, we expect Democratic partisanship
at the district level to be positively associated with support for CST. We
include district median income in the analysis as a measure of aggregate
socioeconomic status. Lower status districts are likely to benefit from and
therefore be sympathetic to domestic social policies consistent with CST.
We also expect that ideological conservatism will be associated with low
levels of support for CST, since its policy implications on economic
issues run contrary conservative principles. An initial plotting of the
data suggested a non-linear relationship between ideology and the dependent variable. Therefore we included a quadratic term in the model.

THE ANALYSIS
Ordered probit was used to derive estimates. Table 1 reports the results of
the analyses. The statistically significant chi-square across both models
indicates the model performs robustly and that the independent variables
significantly increase our ability to explain legislator decision-making in
this area. The coefficients indicate the direction of the relationship
between each independent variable and the dependent variable. For
ease of interpretation, in Table 2, we report changes in the predicted probability of supporting CST at the highest level.
As expected, Catholic affiliation is positively associated with support
for policies consistent with CST (although, see Fetzer 2006 on the
issue of immigration). Table 2 indicates that Catholic legislators are
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about 280% more likely to support CST at the highest level than their colleagues. Among Catholics, the relationship between the generation
dummy variable and support for CST is negative, meaning that
Catholics who came into electorate after Vatican II are less likely to
support CST than their older Catholic peers. The relationship is insignificant using a two-tailed test, but it approaches significance using a onetailed test. (Given the directional nature of our expectations, a onetailed test is justifiable.) These Catholics probably retain the traditionalism of previous generations, but again, the importance of progressive
domestic social policies diminished as the status of Catholics increased.
Interestingly, the relationship between religious salience and support for
CST is significant and, contrary to our expectations, negative. High salience
Catholics are less likely to support CST at the highest levels than their peers
for whom religion is less salient. In other words, the most committed
Catholics less likely to behave in ways consistent with CST as it is
expressed in these votes. While it seems counter-intuitive, this finding is
not altogether surprising given Layman’s (1999) finding that among party
activists, the traditionalist and regularly attending Catholics are more likely
to be Republicans, while secular Catholics are more likely to be Democrats.
If high salience Catholics are more likely to be Republican, then perhaps
high salience Catholic legislators have internalized Republican economic
policy commitments. Or, while voting against the USCCB’s preferences,
these Catholics may be voting for subsidiary in government, a principle
that has strong grounding in Catholic intellectual life.
While Catholics are the focus of the analysis, we note that white evangelical and Jewish legislators are also more likely to support CST than
their mainline colleagues. What makes Catholics unique among the religious families in the model is its centralized ecclesiastical teaching authority that can connect creedal values to secular policy-making. Yet even
for these other denominations, we find that religious identification influences policy decision-making. The finding is not all that surprising for
Jewish legislators, however, since American Jews tend to express high
levels of economic liberalism and support for government services (see
Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2006, ch 7).
The finding for white evangelicals is more puzzling. White evangelicals
in the aggregate are strongly Republican, strongly conservative, and
strongly opposed to economic liberalism and government services (see
Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2006, ch 2 and 7). While many think of cultural
issues as the main animating force for these Christians, they were recruited
into the Republican Party under a larger rubric of “‘big government’ as a
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Analysis of support for Catholic social teaching

Catholic
Jewish
White Evangelical
Black Protestant
Party (Republican ¼ 1)
Ideology
Ideology2
% District Democrat
District median income
Catholic salience
Post V II Generation
N
Chi2
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2

Model 1: All legislators

Model 2: Catholic legislators

.646*** (.166)
.946*** (.323)
.518** (.249)
.190 (.248)
21.594*** (.245)
2.071*** (.011)
.000*** (.000)
.027*** (.000)
2.000 (.000)
–
2.243* (.138)
435
259.54***
2225.75454
.6098

–
–
–
–
21.701*** (.536)
2.067*** (.019)
.000** (.000)
.048*** (.019)
2.000 (.000)
2.569* (.316)
2.303 (.268)
130
123.46***
277.203771
.5562

Notes: *p , .10, **p , .05, ***p , .01, two-tailed. Entries are ordered probit coefficients, with
robust standard errors in parentheses.

threat to traditional religious and economic values” (Wald and CalhounBrown 2006, 214). Yet when we control for partisanship and ideology
we find that white evangelicals are more than twice as likely as their mainline colleagues to support CST. This suggests that at least on these economic/immigration issues, the religious inclinations of these evangelical
Protestants move them to adopt a more progressive stance.
In models 1 and 2, the coefficients for legislator partisanship are negative and strongly significant, demonstrating that Republicans are less
likely to support CST than Democrats. As model 2 demonstrates this
result holds when we consider among Catholics, where Republicans are
about .2801 less likely to support CST than Democrats. District level partisanship also is strongly significant and has the predicted effect. District
level Democratic partisanship is associated with support for CST.
Overall, legislators coming from strong Democratic districts are more
than seven times more likely to support CST at the highest levels than
their colleagues from more moderate districts. Among Catholics, legislators from the strongest Democratic districts are about 176% more
likely to support CST at the highest levels than Catholics from moderately
Democratic districts.
The main ideological coefficient is negative, while the quadratic is
positive, and both coefficients are significant. Practically speaking this
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Analysis of support for Catholic social teaching at the highest level
All legislators

Catholic legislators

.0226

.3002

Baseline probability

Catholic
Jewish
White Evangelical
Black Protestants
Party (Republican ¼ 1)
Ideology
% District Democrat
District median income
Catholic salience
Post V II Generation

Change

% Change

Change

% Change

.0640
.1285
.0476
.0141
2.0223
2.0224
.1662
2.0110
–
2.0103

283.39
569.13
210.65
62.27
298.91
299.44
736.33
249.04
–
245.48

–
–
–
–
2.2801
2.2251
.5306
2.0794
2.1496
2.0947

–
–
–
–
293.31
274.99
176.72
226.45
249.81
231.53

Note: Figures where generated using Clarify for Stata 8. The baseline probability was calculated
holding all the continuous variables at the mean and the categorical variables at zero. Percent
change reflects the change in the predicted probability of supporting CST at the highest level
when moving continuous variables from the mean to max values and categorical variables from
zero to 1.

means that conservatism is associated with lower levels of support for
CST — up to a point. Indeed Table 2 indicates that moving both ideological terms from their mean to maximum values decreases the probability
of supporting CST at the highest levels by .0224. This is a decrease of
almost 100%. To gain a better sense of the dynamic between ideology
and support for CST, Figure 1 displays the relationship between level
of ideological conservatism and the probability of supporting CST at
various levels. As expected, liberals have a high probability of supporting
CST at the highest levels, and moderates have a high probability of establishing a moderate voting record on these issues. The curvilinear relationship seems to be concentrated among the most conservative legislators.
The probability that the most conservative legislators will support CST
at the “Lowest” level is about .26, while the probability of being in the
more liberal “Low” category increases to about .66. That is, highly conservative legislators are about 156% more likely to be moderately conservative than solidly conservative on these issues. While the theoretical
explanation for this goes beyond the parameters of this paper, it warrants
further study.
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RESPONSES OF CATHOLIC LEGISLATORS TO CONFLICTS
WITH CHURCH TEACHING
While Catholic legislators overall are more likely than non-Catholics to
establish voting records that are supportive of CST as it is articulated in
the USCCB policy pronouncements, there are certainly many Catholics
who adopt positions contrary to the Bishops Conference — particularly
Republicans. When the policy positions of Republican Catholic legislators
conflict with Episcopal teachings, we have identified three logical
responses they might take to reconcile their policy position with the
Church. We use interviews of a handful of House Republican Catholics
and USCCB staffers to elucidate the relevance of these three approaches.
The first possibility is to distinguish their personal religious beliefs
from their obligations as a public official and representatives of a pluralistic constituency. Many liberal Democrats adopt a similar stance on the
abortion issue. Mario Cuomo first articulated this position in his 1984
speech at Notre Dame, although a similar position was implied much
earlier in John F. Kennedy’s speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial
Association during the 1960 presidential campaign. Cuomo argued that
although he regarded abortion as sinful he could not, as a public official;
impose such a view on those who did not agree in a context in which a
broad public consensus was not present.

FIGURE 1. Predicted probability of supporting catholic social teaching by level
of ideological conservatism.
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Conservative politicians supporting Republican policy commitments in
this domain might argue that constituency demands for such policies must
take precedence over personal adherence to Church teachings if they are
to fulfill their public obligation as elected representatives. On immigration,
for example, one Catholic Republican made the point that while he understands the Church’s position and “the good that Christ encourages, I have
to look at this like a policy-maker. The people in my district are concerned
that we are becoming a 2nd class nation.” As a result this legislator voted
for the House immigration bill, which was contrary to the Church position.
In doing so, he acknowledged that he acted contrary to CST and explained
that: “I wake up every morning and know that God has given me this day to
do for him. At the end of the day, I have to get down and my knees and say
‘I have failed’ and ask forgiveness.”18
A second possibility is to argue that their policy stances on economic
issues and other domestic issues are perfectly consistent with church
teaching. A number of Catholic intellectuals, such as George Weigel,
Michael Novak, and Richard John Neuhaus, have formulated an interpretation of CST that sees it as supportive of conservative and marketoriented approaches to economic policy.19 They point out that throughout
the corpus of CST private property and capitalist market relations are
affirmed, with some qualification, as mainly positive values.
For these commentators, the strength of this affirmation increased substantially and with less qualification with the publication of John Paul II’s
encyclical Centesimus annus (Weigel 1992), in which John Paul connects
ownership of private property to the “the autonomy and development of
the person” and says it is “an extension of human freedom.”20 The free
market receives a strong endorsement as “the most efficient instrument
for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs.” In addition,
Centesimus annus offers a serious critique of the welfare state as prone to
“bureaucratic ways of thinking” and “an enormous increase in spending.”
John Paul identifies “malfunctions and defects” that reflect a misunderstanding of the proper role of the state. In light of this interpretation of
CST, Catholic legislators might argue that supporting conservative
social policies simply corrects the defects of an overly centralized
welfare state, regardless of what the USCCB advocates.
A corollary to this approach is to argue that their policy stances are perfectly consistent with Church teaching and that the Bishops are wrong on
the issue. This theme recurred a number of times during interviews.
When asked about the extent to which Church teaching influences his
decision-making, one legislator responded that while he reveres the
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Church, “Sometimes you’ll hear an 80 year old Cardinal say something
that is just outrageous.” What is more, clerics “live a cloistered life and
have no clue what’s going on in the world.”21 Another said that, “It
depends on whether they are being consistent with their principles.”22
What is more, “I would argue that supply side economics deals with
the poor better” than welfare. In other words, while this legislator recognizes the priority of helping the poor, he views his policies as more effective than those advocated by the Church.
On immigration, he goes on to argue that growing up as a Catholic,
“I was always taught you had to follow the rules,” and now the Church
is supporting individuals who break the law and break the rules.
Moreover, he charges the Church with hypocrisy on this issue: “What
if 400,000 Turkish Muslims moved to Vatican City, and demanded
accommodation? Demanded the right to determine the laws and vote in
elections? What do you think the response of the Church leaders would
be?” Ultimately, he views his support of the House immigration bill as
consistent with Church teachings and tradition and the USCCB’s position
as incorrect. However, this legislator’s approach suggests something
deeper. It suggests that Catholic legislators who dissent from the
USCCB may disagree over the means of achieving the common good,
rather than the goal of the common good. In their view, free markets
provide a more effective means increasing prosperity among the poor.
Moreover their objections to growing the welfare state as a way to
achieve the common good finds intellectual support in Church teachings
on subsidiary.
A third and related possibility is to argue that church teachings on
economic issues or other domestic issues, such as immigration, are not
authoritative in the same way as a pronouncements on moral issues. On
issues where the Church does not speak authoritatively, sometimes the
bishops are prone to recommending mistaken courses of action that
ought to be contradicted. Church leaders lack the capacity to understand
thoroughly all the dimensions of many domestic policy issues and can be
mistaken about what is the best policy approach. For example, while reducing government spending on programs for the poor may appear to ignore
the preferential option for the poor, in reality these programs actually
harm the poor by making them too dependent on government. Many conservatives made such an argument regarding the USCCB opposition to
welfare reform in 1996. Therefore, Catholic legislators may feel freer
to regard Church teachings on many policies that they favor as not
making any authoritative demands on their policy choices.

When Church Teachings and Policy Commitments Collide

129

One legislator explicitly referenced the distinction between issues of
prudential judgment and moral absolutes. On moral absolutes, such as
abortion, the teaching of the Church is authoritative. In matters of prudential judgment, Church teaching is not authoritative. Therefore, individuals
and legislators are free to apply their own reasoned and morally informed
judgment. To the extent that the Church adopts policy positions, they
should do so in consultation with lay experts, especially Catholic lay
experts. The death penalty, immigration, war, economic policy: these
are all matters of prudential judgment in the view of this legislator,
and he often finds himself adopting positions that are contrary to
USCCB policy positions. On immigration he argued that “The
Sensenbrenner immigration bill, for example, is not a moral absolute.
And some bishops and cardinals in the Church mischaracterized it. It
would not be illegal to give an illegal immigrant the Eucharist.”
What is more, he suggests that when the Church attempts to speak
authoritatively on these issues, when the Bishops elevate their importance
by adopting a seamless garment approach to politics, it weakens efforts to
enact pro-life legislation. This is because pro-choice Catholics can defect
from Church teaching on abortion votes, but still argue that they are observant Catholics because they oppose the death penalty, for example.23 Still,
he listens to the position of the Bishops on these issues and explains that
“I take seriously Church Teaching, and I am happy to engage the
Church on matters of prudential judgment, but only as a conversation.”24
Without making the distinction between moral absolutes and prudential judgment, other legislators simply do not view Church teaching as
determinative of their decision-making. One legislator explained that
while he viewed the presence of the Church on Capitol Hill as positive,
to be a representative is to use one’s own judgment. To be sure, his judgment is informed by a “moral sense” that is influenced by religion. He
incorporates Church teachings into his thoughts and sometimes uses
USCCB staff as a “sounding board.” But he does not automatically
apply Church doctrine. He has his own “thought process” and does not
“automatically apply church dogma.” What is more, even tough this
legislator sometimes votes contrary to Church teaching he still works
closely with the Bishops Conference on other matters.25
Still another legislator indicates that “I look at the Church’s position and
note it, but I decide on my own. My intellect and study of an issue tells me
what to do.” On some issues, however, this legislator rejects Church efforts
to lobby on Capitol Hill: “It is improper for the church or any clergy to
lobby Congress on some issues. I will not take a meeting if they want to
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talk about an issue dealing with Church doctrine. I do not want direction on
abortion or gay marriage. It’s not appropriate. If it’s an issue dealing with
general secular welfare, then okay. World health, aid organizations, that’s
fine.”26 It is interesting that this legislator rejects USCCB lobby on issues
directly relevant to Church doctrine. But it is even more telling that he
views abortion as relevant to Church teachings and does not view world
health and social welfare as relevant to Church teachings.
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive, and they are probably not exhaustive. One can imagine, for example, that as a fourth
approach, legislators might simply ignore the conflict. Unlike the issue
of abortion, Church teachings relevant to economic, health, or immigration
policy are not as well publicized, or normally as strongly advocated as the
Church’s moral stance on life issues. There may be less awareness among
Conservative Catholic legislators of the conflict between their policy positions and Catholic teaching. Or, even if they themselves are aware, the political risk of taking such a conflicting stand is slight if they can assume that
even their Catholic constituents are not likely to notice the conflict.

CONCLUSION
Domestic social policy decision-making is not a function of district need,
as measured by district socioeconomic status. Our investigation suggests
that in the 109th Congress, cleavages on these issues were largely a function
of partisanship and ideology, but also religion. Our study confirms previous
findings in the legislative behavior literature that religion influences legislator preferences. We have demonstrated that it does on domestic social
issues, as it does on previously studied moral and foreign policy issues.
Our key finding is that on domestic social issues, Catholic legislators in
the 109th Congress were more likely than their mainline colleagues to
vote consistent with CST. At the same time, age and Republican partisanship diminish this relationship. While there has been a leftward drift in
this particular dimension of CST since Vatican II, Catholic legislators
who have come of age since then are less likely than their older peers
to support CST in this area. This may be because a decline in the capacity
of the Church to instill its teachings leaves younger Catholics less likely
to accept Church teachings than older Catholics raised in a more traditional Church. Moreover, the social and economic mobility of
Catholics since the 1960s places most in a more affluent social class
than their parents. As a result, the commitments of CST to solidarity
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and concern for the poor are less consistent with their own self-interest.
Also, Republican Catholics have found ways to take positions contrary
to Church teaching without calling into question their religious loyalty.
In contrast to the dilemma liberal Democrats face on moral issues such
as abortion or gay marriage, Republican legislators find it possible to
claim more flexibility in interpreting CST. While they see Church teaching on moral issues as unambiguous and authoritative, the relevance of
CST to their positions on domestic social issues is less obvious.
Several of our respondents readily argue that Church leaders, even
when they articulate specific positions on legislation, may be mistaken
in their interpretation of how Church teaching applies. Therefore,
Catholic Republicans may see CST as less authoritative, relevant, and
subject to prudential judgments in relation to domestic social issues. In
that sense, they may be dissenting from the bishops without dissenting
from Church teachings. To the extent Catholic legislators can claim ambiguity in Church teachings, the religious influence on roll call voting will
be diminished. This raises the interesting question of how Catholic legislators will position themselves in the long run on issues dealing with
unambiguous conflicts between public policy and Church teaching.
NOTES
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APPENDIX: INDEX COMPONENTS27
H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control
Act of 2005: The USCCB strong opposed this bill because, from their perspective,
it “includes many harsh provisions which would bring undue harm to immigrants
and their families.”28 In particular, the Bishops objected to provisions that made
illegal immigration a felony and subjected those who assisted illegal immigrants to
criminal penalties. They go on to say that “The Scriptures as well as Catholic
Social Teaching, form the basis of the Church position.” Legislators voting against
this bill were credited with supporting CST.
H.Res. 653, the reconciliation bill for fiscal year 2006: In his January 24, 2006, letter to
the members of Congress, the Most Reverend William S. Skylstad, president of the
USCCB, expressed disappointment in the reconciliation bill and urged legislators to
oppose it. In particular, Bishop Skylstad argued that the reconciliation bill would
“prove harmful to many low-income children, families, elderly, and people with disabilities who are least able to provide for themselves.”29 In a March 3, 2006, letter,
Bishop Skylstad also expressed concern that the reconciliation bill did not provide sufficient resources to “promote the common good.”30 Legislators voting against this
reconciliation bill were credited with supporting CST.
H.R. 2429, the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2005 (discharge petition): Over the course
of two years, this bill would raise the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25. Noting that
work “is a reflection of our human dignity, and a way to contribute to the common
good,” the Bishops Conference argue that the “minimum wage needs to be raised to
help restore its purchasing power, not just for the goods and services one can buy
but for the self-esteem and self-worth it affords the worker.”26 To that end, the
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Bishops Conference strongly supported this bill and encouraged individuals to contact
their Members of Congress and ask them to sign the discharge petition that would
bring the bill to the floor. Legislators signing the discharge petition were credited
with supporting CST.
H.Amdt. 8, H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005: This amendment sought to strike
section 101 entitled “Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Relief from Removal”
from the bill. Section 101 “requires all applicants for asylum to prove that ‘at least
one central reason’ behind their persecution is one of the following: the applicant’s
race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or membership in a particular social
group. (Previously, the law required that persecution be based on one of the five
grounds but did not have the “central reason” requirement).”31 Legislators voting
for this amendment were credited with supporting CST.
H.Amdt. 425, H.R. 3058, Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006: This amendment would prohibit funds from
being used to enforce section 703 of the District of Columbia Firearms Control Act
which requires certain firearms to be unloaded and disassembled. Legislators voting
against this amendment were credited with supporting CST.
H.Amdt. 596, H.R. 1461, Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005: The USCCB
opposed this manager’s amendment and viewed as “restrictive.” This amendment
limits the ability of groups that receive Federal funds to build affordable housing to
participate in voter registration drives. Legislators voting against this amendment
were credited with supporting CST.
H.Amdt. 648, H.R.4437, Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2005: This amendment mandates the construction of specific security
fencing along the Southwest border for the purposes of gaining operational control of
the border. Legislators voting against this amendment were credited with supporting
CST.

